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 The ALP after 2004 
 
Abstract 
In 2004, for the first time in the two decades for which Australian Election Study (AES) 
data has become available, more blue-collar workers cast their primary vote for the 
Coalition parties than for Labor.  Blue-collar support for Labor had partially recovered 
under Beazley in 1998 and 2001 following its dramatic drop under Keating in 1996 but 
it dropped to even lower levels under Latham in 2004.  This paper analyses AES 
survey data, the actual voting results in each federal electorate and the demographic 
characteristics of those electorates to discuss the nature of Labor’s latest national 
election defeat and the reasons for it. There is considerable disagreement among 
commentators as to whether Labor has lost the last four national elections because it 
has failed to reconnect with its traditional voter base; or because it has failed to go 
beyond that base. Much of the disagreement centres on how blue-collar workers are to 
be understood.  Are they ‘battlers’ and victims of ‘globalisation’ or have they become 
prosperous, upwardly-mobile and ‘aspirational’?  Related questions include whether the 
most salient issues for blue-collar voters are economic, or cultural; and whether the 
most important inequalities in Australian society should be measured in terms of 
income; or occupation; or geographic location (including degree of distance from the 
inner-city).  This paper analyses the policies presented in the 2004 election and 
engages with informed journalistic analyses, and contributions from past and present 
politicians, in addition to the work of political scientists, to help make sense of precisely 
where and why Labor lost support in 2004 and the implications this has for future ALP 
policy and strategy.  The paper also contributes to the longer-term debates about the 
reasons for Howard’s electoral ascendancy since 1996; and the role and constituency 
of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party. 
 
After taking into account the effect of electoral redistributions, only a net total of 
four seats changed hands from the Australian Labor Party (ALP) to the Liberal and 
National parties (LNP) on 9 October 2004, but the ALP’s primary vote fell to its 
lowest level since 1906 (calculated from: McAllister et al. 1997, 83-87; Newman 
2005, 64).1  The ALP’s latest election defeat also represents the worst stagnation 
of Labor’s primary vote over four consecutive national elections in the Party’s 
history.   
 
The failure of the ALP to stop a further fall of its first preference vote in 2004 is 
even more serious considering that the primary vote of the Australian Democrats 
fell dramatically at this election following years of internal strife.  Some of the 
former Democrats voters could reasonably have been expected to switch to the 
ALP.  The fall in the Democrats vote has coincided with a rise in support for the 
Greens, yet the ALP’s primary vote did not increase whereas the combined 
primary vote of the Liberal and National parties did.  This may be because any 
crossovers from former Democrat voters to the ALP were offset by moves of other, 
formerly ALP voters to the Liberals.   
 
In addition, the continuing steep fall in the vote for Pauline Hanson’s One Nation 
(PHON) Party – since its spectacular debut in 1998 amid a shake-up of 
longstanding voter loyalties in Australia then – has not coincided with any rise in 
the ALP’s primary vote in the last two elections. 
 
                                                 
1 In line with convention among political scientists, the NSW (Lang) Labor vote is included in 
calculations of the total ALP vote for the 1931 and 1934 elections.  
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Table 1 sets out key data on the changing pattern of Australian political parties’ 
support at national elections since 1983.  
 
Table 1 : Party support at national elections  
 
Proportion of formal primary votes cast in the House of Representatives (%) 
 
Year ALP LNP Democrats Greens PHON 
1983 49.5 43.6   5.0   
1984 47.5 45.0   5.4   
1987 45.8 46.0   6.0   
1990 39.4 43.5 11.3 1.4  
1993 44.9 44.3   3.8 1.9  
1996 38.8 47.3   6.8 2.9  
1998 40.1 39.5   5.1 2.6 8.4 
2001 37.8 43.0   5.4 5.0 4.3 
2004 37.6 46.7   1.2 7.2 1.2 
 
Source: Newman 2005, 64.  The LNP figures here include the Northern Territory Country Liberal 
Party votes. 
 
The Table makes clear how far the ALP’s primary vote has fallen since the 1983 
Hawke landslide, including the fact that it has risen in only two of the last eight 
national elections: 1993 and 1998.  On both these occasions the ALP’s opponents 
were proposing an unpopular move to new indirect taxes. 
 
In terms of the electorally decisive two party preferred (2PP) vote, the outcome 
nationally in 2004 was less historically bad for the ALP than the trend in the Party’s 
primary vote.  At 47.3%, Labor’s 2PP proportion of votes is higher now than it has 
been on six previous occasions since the Second World War including, most 
recently, 1996, 1977, 1975, and 1966.  However, even in two party preferred 
terms, there were swings against the ALP in 107 seats in the 2004 election, 
whereas only 43 swung towards the ALP.  
 
The swings against Labor in 2004 were lowest in electorates classified by the 
Australian Electoral Commission as “inner metropolitan: located in a capital city 
and comprising well-established, built-up suburbs”; and highest in those 
electorates classified as “outer metropolitan: located in capital cities and 
containing areas of more recent urban expansion” (Australian Electoral 
Commission 2005). 
 
Table 2 draws on publications of data from the Australian Election Study and 
shows that the proportion of blue-collar (or ‘manual’) workers voting ALP fell to just 
42 per cent in 2004, which is the lowest recorded in the two decades of national 
elections for which data from this Study is available.  Moreover, for the first time in 
these two decades, more blue-collar workers cast their first preference vote for the 
LNP in 2004 than did for the ALP. 
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Table 2: The major Parties’ support from blue-collar workers 
 
Year Proportion voting 
ALP (%) 
Proportion voting 
LNP (%) 
1984 65 31 
1987 59 34 
1990 50 38 
1993 59 33 
1996 44 43 
1998 46 37 
2001 47 39 
2004 42 47 
 
Sources: McAllister and Ascui 1988, 230 (for recalled 1984 vote and 1987 vote); McAllister 1992, 
159 (for 1990); Bean 2000, 76 (for 1993 and 1996); Bean and McAllister 2000, 179 (for 1998); 
Bean and McAllister 2002, 276 (for 2001); Bean and McAllister 2005, 325 (for 2004).                                            
 
Table 2 when compared with Table 1 shows that blue-collar workers’ support for 
the ALP has fallen more steeply than overall support for the ALP in the last two 
decades.  However, blue-collar support for Labor rose to a greater extent in the 
1993 election than did the ALP’s overall vote, when major and unpopular industrial 
relations changes were being proposed by the ALP’s opponents (alongside new 
indirect taxes and a weakening of Medicare).  Many more blue-collar workers 
appear to have defected from the ALP to the LNP in the 2004 election, when the 
dominant issues were economic, than in 2001, when the asylum seeker issue was 
unusually prominent.  The timing of these trends tends to support the view that 
material economic issues are more important to blue-collar voters than cultural 
issues. 
 
The distinction between blue-collar and white-collar workers is in many ways 
artificial, and there are large and growing numbers of routine white-collar workers 
employed in low-paid, casual jobs who, in their incomes and prospects, are closer 
to many blue-collar workers than they are to the ‘career’ sections of the labour force.  
A distinction between ‘jobs’ and ‘careers’ tells us more than does a distinction 
between blue-collar and white-collar workers.   
 
However there are methodological impediments (including major changes in the 
official classification of occupations) to making comparisons of the bases of support 
for the major political parties over 20 years as in the above Table unless we limit the 
data to the trends among blue-collar workers (currently categorised in the census as: 
tradespersons and related workers; intermediate production and transport 
workers; and labourers and related workers).  
 
Trends in the political outlook of blue-collar workers can still be important indicators 
of the political outlook of the working class defined more broadly to include routine 
white-collar workers (Scott 2004, 3). 
 
 4
In 2004 the ALP’s family tax policy would explicitly have made some struggling 
people in safe Labor seats economically worse off, which may have prompted the 
voters in those seats to respond by making Labor electorally worse off. 
 
There was also the ALP’s sudden proposal late in the campaign to end logging in 
Tasmania’s old growth forests without making specific or negotiated alternative 
employment arrangements for the displaced workers.  Although many voters if 
asked may well have said yes to the desirability of protecting Tasmania’s old 
growth forests from logging, this issue was simply not central in most voters’ 
priorities. The number of workers who would have been directly affected by 
Labor’s policy was magnified politically by the image of Prime Minister Howard 
reassuring those Tasmanian timber workers threatened by job loss.  The picture of 
Howard saying “I’ll save your jobs” to these workers powerfully contrasted 
throughout blue-collar Australia with the memories of Keating and Hawke’s 
dismissive attitude to much larger numbers of manufacturing industry workers in 
the economic restructurings promoted by the Labor governments of the 1980s and 
early 1990s.   
 
The Coalition parties also prominently promoted in the 2004 election campaign a 
new agenda for technical education and apprenticeships, which would have 
appealed to parents in Australia whose children do not get University places.   
 
The process of suburbanisation has generally aided the ALP's electoral prospects 
since the 1960s by dispersing people in blue-collar and routine white-collar 
occupations who had a disposition to vote ALP across many electorates.  The voters 
moving to the outer suburbs of Australia’s capital cities and taking out large 
mortgages, however, have had decreasingly direct and deep traditional cultural 
attachments to the ALP.  In 1996 and subsequently they have shown that they are 
reluctant to forgive and forget the direct jolts to their material security caused by 
the high interest rates imposed by the Hawke and Keating governments.  Voters in 
the newer growing outer suburbs are prone to react against Labor when there are 
doubts raised over its capacity as economic managers, as was the case in 2004.   
 
Table 2 when compared with Table 1 also shows that the ALP particularly lost – 
and the LNP particularly gained – support from blue-collar voters in the 2004 
election, in contrast to the trends in 1998 and 2001.  However, Paul Keating, who 
as Prime Minister led the ALP to a similar defeat in 1996 in terms of the 
occupational groups which particularly swung against the Party then, has recently 
re-emerged to claim that Labor erred by “playing to its base'' rather than appealing 
sufficiently to ‘aspirational’ voters during the 2004 election campaign (The 
Weekend Australian 3-4 June 2006).  Keating has made the remarkable claim that 
in 2004 Mark Latham pitched his “appeal to the ‘battlers’” (The Weekend 
Australian 3-4 June 2006) and that, in general, “since 1996…Labor has turned its 
back on upward mobility” (quoted in Megalogenis 2006, 233); “lost the young 
people and…lost those that have gone out to employ themselves” (Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation 2006).   
 
Keating has not mentioned, in his recent statements, the many voters lost to Labor 
in 1996 and earlier in the ALP’s time in government.  His claims are also open to 
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three obvious challenges.  The first is that the very term ‘aspirational’ is messy and 
misleading, as Sean Scalmer has shown (Scalmer 2005).  The second is that 
Mark Latham can hardly be said not to have courted this perceived constituency – 
indeed he seemed fixated on so-called ‘aspirational’ voters.  The third problem 
with Keating’s claims is the actual electoral evidence which contradicts them.  
 
Table 3 shows the trends in ALP support among young voters, and among the 
self-employed, at national elections in the last two decades. 
 
Table 3: The ALP’s support from young voters, and from the self-employed 
 
Year Proportion of 18-24 year 
olds voting ALP (%) 
Proportion of self-
employed voting ALP (%)
1984 54 34 
1987 50 27 
1990 49 26  
1993 44 25 
1996 31 19 
1998 47 28 
2001 46 24 
2004 34 23 
 
Sources: McAllister and Ascui 1988, 227, 230 (for recalled 1984 vote and 1987 vote); McAllister 
and Bean, 1990, 166, and McAllister 1992, 162 (for 1990); Bean 2000, 79, 83 (for 1993 and 1996); 
Bean and McAllister 2000, 178-179 (for 1998); Bean and McAllister 2002, 275-276 (for 2001); Bean 
and McAllister 2005, 324-325 (for 2004).                                                                             
 
The data in Tables 2 and 3 show that Labor rebuilt some of its lost support among 
blue-collar and young voters in 1998 and 2001 after the low-points to which they 
had fallen in 1996; but then, under Latham in 2004, Labor support from these 
voters fell back to similar levels to 1996.  The ALP’s support among the self-
employed, meanwhile, has been higher at each election since 1996 than it was in 
that year, when Labor lost office under Keating; and it is not now significantly lower 
than when Labor was winning elections in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
Latham’s pitch in 2004 was not in fact to the ‘battlers’ but was actually very similar 
to Keating’s own approach in 1996 – and it had similar electoral results.  By 
contrast Beazley’s more traditionalist pitch was more electorally effective, 
especially in 1998. 
 
Keating’s claims were made in interviews for and about a new book by George 
Megalogenis, a journalist who analyses statistics and incorporates his findings with 
some flair into a wide-ranging political analysis.  Megalogenis himself tends to 
endorse Keating’s views on the ALP’s consecutive national election defeats since 
1996: writing for instance that in 1998 and 2001 “Beazley didn't know how to play 
the politics of prosperity” (Megalogenis 2006, 232).  
 
Amidst the two books by Megalogenis (2003, 2006) however is a wide range of 
thought-provoking inquiries and insights into the demographics underlying 
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changes in Australians’ partisan loyalties in the last two decades, including the 
altered position of women in Australia’s workforce and wider society.  
Megalogenis’s findings concerning blue-collar workers, when combined with and 
counterbalanced by other data, can be developed to support a quite contrary view 
to that expressed by Keating.   
 
Although Megalogenis emphasises Australia’s general prosperity since the early 
1990s he also recognises gaps in the well-being and inevitable limits to its 
longevity: 
 
Keating bequeathed Howard in 1996…[both] an upwardly mobile working 
class and [my italics] an expanding underclass (Megalogenis 2006, 2).  
 
Megalogenis writes about 
 
deregulation’s underclass, the families with dependent children where there 
is no breadwinner role-model…[and the fact that of these] 357,000 jobless 
families…the majority are easily identifiable: they are Australian-born single 
mothers (Megalogenis 2006, 192).  
 
He expresses concern that 
 
A nation that is raising one in five of its children in households without a 
breadwinner has less reason to be satisfied than it might think.  The danger 
of the Howard era is that…the next generation will awake to find it has a 
permanent underclass in its midst (Megalogenis 2006, 297).  
 
Some would argue that there is such a permanent underclass in Australia already.  
The steep long-term decline in the proportion of men in full-time jobs since the 
1970s (Frijters and Gregory 2006, 9) is among the evidence pointing to this. 
 
As at the last national census, there are still 2.4 million blue-collar workers in the 
Australian workforce (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2003). Nearly half a million of 
these workers are women (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2003).  Some blue-collar 
workers have become visibly more affluent in the last decade – and there has 
been much media interest in those who are turning into self-employed contractors, 
seeming to become ‘aspirational’ and moving into so-called ‘McMansions’ in outer 
suburbs.  
 
According to Megalogenis, in the early 1990s: 
 
The blue-collar male…had two choices during the recession: work for 
himself, or go on welfare (Megalogenis 2006, 147). 
 
Megalogenis emphasises the subsequent upward mobility of some male blue-
collar workers: 
 
the lost blue-collar worker…used his redundancy cheque from Telstra, or 
the state electricity monopoly, or a medium-sized manufacturer, to…begin a 
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second career as a handyman.  These defectors became Coalition voters, 
first because of the recession, which they blamed on Keating; then because 
of the recovery, which they thanked Howard for…  
 
Four out of every five people who decided to work for themselves in the 
1990s were aged 50 or over, and most were handymen. They were the 
workers we had to have to do our renovations and landscaping in the 
second half of the decade (Megalogenis 2006, 41-42).  
 
However, examination of the statistics on which Megalogenis draws indicates that 
the proportion of blue-collar workers still in the workforce who are self-employed 
only amounts to one fifth of all blue-collar workers (Australian Bureau of Statistics 
2005).  Many of these are in fact “disguised” employees (see Watson et al. 2003, 
63-64, 71-72); while 80 per cent of all blue-collar workers in the labour force are 
still, unequivocally, employees.   
 
Then there are the very large numbers of retrenched and still unemployed former 
blue-collar workers who were hit hardest of all by the early 1990s recession, 
including the many migrant women displaced from the textile, clothing and 
footwear industries. 
 
As Megalogenis also acknowledges, 
 
When Howard took office, there were 500 000 people on the disability-
support pension.  In Keating's recession, this payment had become a 
halfway house between the dole and the age pension for many of those too 
old to be reemployed but too young to retire.  The Coalition's changes to job 
assistance did little to help this group.  Eight years on, their ranks had risen 
to 700 000 (Megalogenis 2006, 203).  
 
The many former blue-collar workers on the disability-support pension may no 
longer be recorded in the labour force statistics; but they are still on the electoral 
rolls. 
 
In Australia’s latest national census a continuing close association is shown to 
exist between blue-collar workers and socio-economic disadvantage.  Areas of 
Sydney, for example, with high percentages of blue-collar workers also currently 
tend to have high levels of people without qualifications and high numbers of 
unemployed people; and a low incidence of people using the internet at home 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2002, 58).   
 
People who move to the outer suburbs may thereby be able to have larger houses 
but they do not have the same access to public transport and other infrastructure 
and amenities as do people who can afford to buy the more expensive houses 
closer to the CBDs of Australia’s capital cities.  
 
As Megalogenis elsewhere writes, in the recovery from the early 1990s recession, 
“the jobs were not going to those who had been retrenched in the recession”, and 
in consequence many “blue-collar…voters had time on their hands and an axe to 
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grind with globalisation”.  These blue-collar voters “were older [and] more likely to 
be unemployed” and “Australia in the 1990s was a scary place for these 
people…These voters broke with a habit of a lifetime and began supporting the 
minor parties, which propelled the main parties onto a decade-long search for a 
new language to bring them back, to make them feel like they were part of the 
nation” (Megalogenis 2006, 69, 102-103).  
 
Megalogenis identifies how Paul Keating 
 
could never bring himself to soften his presentation, to strip away the layers 
of his personality that turned off traditional Labor supporters (Megalogenis 
2006, 151). 
 
The same can be said for Mark Latham’s style and approach in the 2004 election. 
 
By contrast, as Megalogenis points out, 
 
What made Howard believable to voters in the mid-1990s, when he hadn’t 
been in the 1980s, were his social policies.  His conservative agenda 
helped to create the impression [my italics] that he was, in fact, offering to 
undo some of Keating’s economic agenda because they talked about 
restoring old Australian values… 
 
The mandate he was seeking was socially conservative and economically 
liberal.  It was, in reality, the same mix that he had deployed in the 1980s, 
but with one subtle difference: this time, he would not try to position himself 
to the right of Labor on economics…. 
 
Howard’s homespun persona made sense against Keating in the mid-1990s 
in the way that it never could have in the 1980s because the nation had 
grown tired of deregulation… 
 
Howard…gave a voice to one group of reform’s losers, the blue-collar men 
who Keating had ignored in the early 1990s after he had taken away their 
jobs.  He understood before Keating did that Australia had been fractured 
by deregulation, and that a majority at the ballot had to be built, one voting 
bloc at a time (Megalogenis 2006, 170-172, 289). 
 
Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party has been associated with the separation of 
the so-called ‘Howard battlers’ in Australia from traditional ALP voting loyalties.  
Megalogenis argues that  
 
The recessions of 1982-83 and 1991 wiped out a generation of blue-collar 
men, and had sent them into the political arms of Pauline Hanson by the 
second half of the 1990s (Megalogenis 2006, 25-26)   
 
and that Pauline Hanson  
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said a lot about Australia north of the Murray River.  Almost 1 million people 
voted for her party at the 1998 federal election, and two-thirds lived in 
Queensland and NSW.  
 
…Why did Queensland, and to a lesser extent NSW, embrace Hansonism, 
but not Victoria, which had been the state that took the heaviest fall in the 
recession?  The simple explanation is that Victoria, the home of 
multiculturalism, was offended by Hanson's anti-black, anti-Asian platform.  
By contrast, Queensland had the lowest immigrant population of the 
mainland states, and so it didn't see the offence in her utterances…  
 
[and,] there is another immigrant angle to help explain why Queenslanders 
were the voters most attracted to Hanson…  
 
Brisbane collects 2 000 more retirees and low-skilled workers from Sydney 
and Melbourne each year than it loses… 
 
One Nation voters were predominately older men, in their forties and fifties, 
without work and on welfare.  They lived along the Queensland coastline, 
but that did not necessarily make them locals.  Some were economic 
refugees from the southern states, including multicultural Victoria… 
 
regional Australia [was] telling the politicians that they were mugs for 
deregulating Australia's industries when the rest of the world wouldn't return 
the compliment by opening their markets to us.  Hanson tapped this feeling 
with her economic nationalism (Megalogenis 2006, 211, 223-225). 
 
According to Megalogenis, Howard won the Hanson supporters back after 1998, 
particularly with his stand in 2001 against the Tampa asylum seekers (see 
Megalogenis 2003, 181-183).  The Megalogenis analysis is conducted using 
different methods, but his conclusions closely match, leading political scientists’ 
investigations into the basis of support for Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party in 
1998 (see McAllister and Bean 2000), and into the reasons for the shift in support 
by PHON voters to the LNP between 1998 and 2001 (see McAllister 2003, 450).   
 
Conservative social policies have been part of Howard’s appeal to some blue-
collar workers since 1996, but the salience which these issues have acquired has 
been due to the erosion of traditional differences between the major parties on 
economic policy (for a particularly good contribution to the debate on the relative 
importance of these factors in support for PHON, see Turnbull and Wilson 2001). 
 
Megalogenis believes that 
 
Before we look at what the Howard years have meant, we have to deter 
some popular misconceptions about the battlers.  Think of the 150 
electorates in the federal parliament as three zones of 50 seats each: 
higher-income, middle-income and bottom.  The battlers reside 
predominately in the bottom-50 seats on the electoral income-ladder.  
Generally speaking, the battler electorates are in country towns and the 
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bush, where the voters are older and earning less than the norm…[they are] 
WW seats…white and on welfare (Megalogenis 2006, 190-191). 
 
When ‘battlers’ are defined in these terms, i.e. according to income, Megalogenis 
finds that 
 
The Liberal and National Parties held the majority of the battler electorates 
throughout the 1980s, despite the rivalry between Howard and Peacock.  
They even had the majority of the bottom-50 electorates in 1993, despite 
Fightback!  (Megalogenis 2006, 191).  
 
This is correct; but only because low-income voters in rural electorates have 
historically identified differently than low-income voters in urban electorates.  This 
simply reflects the long-standing and well-known fact that in Australia the country-
city divide has overridden other potential political allegiances.   
 
Measuring electorates by income is not an adequate method for defining ‘battlers’, 
in part for the reason that stated income at census has always been an unreliable 
measure of real socio-economic position because the rich can understate their 
income.  Furthermore, income does not reflect assets, which is particularly 
relevant for rural electorates with farmers who hold major assets even if their 
annual income stream is not great.   
 
When measured by occupation – which is after all the traditional basis of the 
party/class divide between Labor and non-Labor in Australian political science – 
the ALP held 46 of the ‘bottom’ 50 seats, i.e. those with the lowest proportions of 
professional and managerial occupations, in 1993.   
 
Categorising electorates according to whether they have a low proportion of 
professional and managerial occupations is a better way of identifying ‘battler’ 
electorates than categorising according to high numbers of blue-collar 
occupations, because it takes in the large number of predominantly female 
clerical, sales and service jobs in addition to the tradespersons, production and 
transport workers, and labourers.    
 
While it is always important to be cautious about reaching conclusions from 
aggregate level data of this kind, the relationship between the demographic 
characteristics and the voting patterns of electorates can give valuable clues to 
supplement those parts of the voting behaviour picture which are provided by 
individual survey data such as the Australian Election Study.  
 
Table 4 draws from publications of data by Australia’s Parliamentary Library about 
the occupational profile of electorates at the census closest to each election, on 
the boundaries which applied at each election; and the corresponding election 
results.   
 
It shows that Labor’s majority in the 50 electorates with most ‘battler’ occupations 
was overwhelming in 1993 but that it has slumped drastically since then, and that 
it fell below 30 in both 1996 and in 2004. 
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Table 4: ALP strength in electorates with most ‘battler’ occupations  
 
YEAR Number out of the 50 seats with the 
lowest proportion of professionals, 
managers and administrators held 
by ALP 
1993 46 
1996 28 
1998 36 
2001 30 
 2004 29 
 
Sources: Kopras 1993, Table 42b; Kopras 1998, Table 43b; Kopras 2000, Table 43b; Kopras 2003, 
Table 41b; Kopras 2004, Table 48b; Australian Electoral Commission 1999; Australian Electoral 
Commission 2002; Australian Electoral Commission 2005. 
 
The inadequacy of stated income at censuses alone as a measure of people’s real 
relative social and economic position has prompted the Parliamentary Library to 
now develop an Index of Relative Socio-Economic Advantage and Disadvantage 
as a fuller measure. This composite measure takes into account occupations, 
employment status and tertiary education qualifications as well as income.   
 
Comparison of the 2004 election swings with this Index of Relative Socio-
Economic Advantage and Disadvantage (Newman and Kopras 2004) indicates 
that 14 of the seats which swung to Labor in 2004 were from the 20 richest seats 
in the nation, whereas all of the 23 most socio-economically disadvantaged seats 
in Australia swung against the ALP.   
 
Those voters who swung to Labor (and those who stayed with and/or went to the 
Greens) in 2004 in many of what have become the relatively affluent inner suburbs 
of Australia’s capital cities were moved by – because they could afford to be 
moved by – ethical concerns which have been raised about the lack of propriety of 
the Howard Government.  Voters in the outer suburbs moved away from Labor 
because they were most concerned about major economic issues, which Labor in 
this election conspicuously failed to tackle.  The swing against Labor in 2004 was 
consistently from voters in seats below a certain socio-economic threshold of 
security and comfort.  Labor was simply not attuned enough to the primary issue 
for the majority of voters, which is anxiety about their economic security, the 
maintenance of which crucially underpins, and is a precondition for, their pursuit of 
other goals.   
 
The blue-collar swing against the ALP in 2004 should therefore be understood as 
part of the reaction of less well-off sections of Australian society against an ALP 
which under Latham appeared unconcerned with their material needs – rather 
than being the expression of a so-called ‘aspirational’ stratum which found Labor 
insufficiently individualist; or some groundswell of cultural conservatism. 
 
Megalogenis regrets that 
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politicians treat working families as if they were battlers because that’s how 
these couples see themselves.  Their gripe is the cost of living…But these 
people are time-poor [my italics] not income poor (Megalogenis 2006, 190-
191).  
 
Being time-poor is a real and widespread problem however, and an increasing 
potential political issue given the trends to work intensification, and to increased 
difficulties juggling work pressures with family life, which have developed in and 
since the 1990s.  Howard as Prime Minister has talked about the importance of 
this issue but has not acted to remedy it; and his major industrial relations 
overhaul which has begun to take effect in 2006 is likely to exacerbate it.  Those 
who are not currently measured as income-poor know full well that if they do ease 
off on their time commitment to their work then they risk becoming income-poor. 
 
People in areas below a certain socio-economic threshold of security and comfort 
are the most greatly at risk from increased debt levels, and are understandably 
therefore the most anxious about the possibility of there being a return to high 
interest rates.  They are struggling to keep their heads above water at work in the 
hope of sustaining current incomes, they are the most vulnerable to possible 
economic downturn, and they are the most worried about losing recent economic 
gains.   
 
The ALP’s decision not to talk about its industrial relations policy in the 2004 
election meant that the Party had nothing public to say about the widespread 
feelings of job insecurity among workers in the current labour market.  These 
feelings may be as much a cause of anxiety about meeting mortgage debt 
payments as are interest rate levels.  Labor now needs to convey the complexity 
of factors which affect interest rates and the other factors that make home 
ownership feasible or not for working people, which include more secure 
employment prospects.   
 
Kim Beazley, having returned to the ALP leadership after the Party’s 2004 election 
loss under Latham, has made clear commitments to repeal Howard’s latest 
industrial relations changes and the earlier instalments including Australian 
Workplace Agreements.  This is a sensible and appropriate strategy to make 
industrial relations a central issue, and to increase the ALP’s differences from the 
LNP on this issue, in order to appeal to the broad majority of wage and salary 
earners among whom Labor needs to win more support.
 
What Howard’s new industrial relations legislation does is, to use Megalogenis’s 
words, put the LNP back “to the right of Labor on economics”, as it was in 1993.  
There is strong majority opposition to these industrial relations changes (see e.g. 
Meagher and Wilson 2006, 2), they are expected to have widespread negative 
effects, and Howard seems less likely to compromise on this core ideological 
commitment than he has on other policies.  This gives Labor the possibility of 
reconstructing a similar winning electoral base of support as it achieved in 1993.  
To do this, Labor will need to further develop its economic policy differences from 
the LNP and show that, despite the impression which Howard may have given 
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since 1996 of relaxing the imposition of economic change, the real effect of his 
new industrial relations changes will be to re-intensify this change and thereby 
cause more insecurity. 
 
Megalogenis is perceptive in pointing to the economic fragility beneath Australia’s 
present veneer of prosperity.  He writes how Australians have entered 
 
[a] new type of debt danger-zone… 
 
[how] Australia is a quarry with a view, a first world consumer and services 
economy, supported by a third world commodities base…  
 
[and how] the next recession, whenever it strikes, will have something to do 
with the household debt binge that Howard [has] sanctioned (Megalogenis 
2006, 257, 286, 299).  
 
The economy is indeed far from ‘strong’ under the Howard Government, according 
to objective economic measures, when so much growth and activity rests on the 
fragile foundations of household and personal consumer debt.  Nor can it be 
regarded as ‘strong’ when it is regularly producing very large balance of payments 
deficits.  These trade deficits and the absence of an export effort from Australia 
since 1996 have been allowed to become irrelevant to political assessments of the 
health of the economy whereas they were central in the 1980s.   
 
The ALP policy approach after 2004, in the lead-up to the 2007 election, needs to 
include industry policies to promote exports and other policies to tackle the real 
extent of unemployment, which is much higher than the narrow official 
calculations.  The persistence of damaging skill shortages also means that any 
substantial Labor alternative proposals for investment in quality apprenticeships 
are likely to win public support. 
  
The belated recognition by the ALP that economic policy now matters is not the 
same as identifying which economic policy approach will now be likely to rebuild 
Labor’s support.   
 
Despite the sudden impression during the 2004 election campaign of big spending 
by both major parties after the Treasury’s mid-campaign announcement of greater 
than expected funds, the Commonwealth budget remains well in surplus because 
of an inflow of revenue from debt-funded consumption, previous cuts made to 
socially valuable programs and government failure to invest in much needed 
infrastructure including higher education.  Greater public investment in community 
facilities and services is now needed in Australia and – the ALP needs particularly 
to note – it is needed most of all by voters in the new outer suburbs, in order to 
reduce their socio-economic distance from the well-established inner urban areas.  
 
The ALP after 2004 needs to outline a credible economic policy program different 
from that pursued for most of the Hawke/Keating years, one that promotes greater 
security and fairness for the broad majority of ordinary working people, in order to 
win back seats which it has lost and to pick up other socio-economically similar 
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electorates.  If Labor takes this course, then it may be possible for it to win the 
next national election, despite the low depths to which its primary vote has recently 
fallen.  
 
References 
 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2006.  ‘Keating Outlines Plan for Labor Win’.  
The 7.30 Report television program transcript, 8 May.  
<http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2006/s1633667.htm>.  Consulted 9 May 
2006. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 2002.  Sydney: A Social Atlas.  Canberra: ABS.  
Australian Bureau of Statistics 2003.  Working Population Profile, Catalogue No. 
2006.0.  Canberra: ABS. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 2005.  Australian Labour Market Statistics, 
Catalogue No. 6105.0, July.  Spreadsheets.  <http://www.abs.gov.au>.  Consulted 
28 June 2006. 
Australian Electoral Commission 1999.  Election Statistics: 1993, 1996, 1998.  CD-
ROM.  Canberra: AEC. 
Australian Electoral Commission 2002.  Election 2001: Election Results.  CD-
ROM.  Canberra: AEC. 
Australian Electoral Commission 2005.  Election 2004: Election Results.  CD-
ROM.  Canberra: AEC. 
Bean, C. 2000. ‘Who Now Votes Labor?’.  In The Machine: Labor Confronts the 
Future, (eds) J. Warhurst and A. Parkin.  Sydney: Allen and Unwin. 
Bean, C. and I. McAllister 2000.  ‘Voting Behaviour’.  In Howard's Agenda: The 
1998 Australian Election, (eds) M. Simms and J. Warhurst.  Brisbane: University of 
Queensland Press.   
Bean, C. and I. McAllister 2002.  ‘From Impossibility to Certainty: Explaining the 
Coalition’s Victory in 2001’.  In 2001: The Centenary Election (eds) J. Warhurst 
and M. Simms.  Brisbane: University of Queensland Press. 
Bean, C. and I. McAllister 2005.  ‘Voting Behaviour: Not an Election of Interest 
(Rates)’.  In Mortgage Nation: The 2004 Australian Election, (eds) M. Simms and 
J. Warhurst.  Perth: API Network. 
Frijters, P. and R. Gregory 2006, ‘From Golden Age to Golden Age: Australia’s 
“Great Leap Forward”?’. 
<http://econrsss.anu.edu.au/Staff/gregory/pdf/greatleapforward.pdf>.  Consulted 2 
July 2006. 
Kopras A. 1993.  Comparisons of 1991 Census Characteristics: Commonwealth 
Electoral Divisions.  Background Paper 20.  Canberra: Parliamentary Library. 
Kopras A. 1998.  Electorate Rankings: Census 1996.  Background Paper 14.  
Canberra: Parliamentary Library. 
Kopras A. 2000.  Electorate Rankings: Census 1996 (2000 Electoral Boundaries).  
Research Paper 11.  Canberra: Parliamentary Library. 
Kopras A. 2003.  Electorate Rankings: Census 2001.  Research Paper 2.  
Canberra: Parliamentary Library. 
Kopras A. 2004.  Electoral Rankings: Census 2001 (2003 boundaries).  Research 
Paper 1.  Canberra: Parliamentary Library. 
McAllister I. 1992.  Political Behaviour: Citizens, Parties and Elites in Australia. 
Melbourne: Longman Cheshire. 
 15
McAllister I. 2003.  ‘Border Protection, the 2001 Australian Election and the 
Coalition Victory’.  Australian Journal of Political Science 38:445-463. 
McAllister I. and A. Ascui 1988.  ‘Voting Patterns’.  In Australia Votes: The 1987 
Federal Election, (eds), I. McAllister and J. Warhurst.  Melbourne: Longman 
Cheshire. 
McAllister I. and C. Bean 1990.  ‘Explaining Labor’s Victory’.  In The Greening of 
Australian Politics: The 1990 Federal Election (eds) C. Bean, I. McAllister and J. 
Warhurst.  Melbourne: Longman Cheshire. 
McAllister I. and C. Bean 2000.  ‘The Electoral Politics of Economic Reform in 
Australia: The 1998 Election’.  Australian Journal of Political Science 35:383-399. 
McAllister, I., M. Mackerras, and C. Brown Boldiston 1997.  Australian Political 
Facts, 2nd ed.  Melbourne: Macmillan. 
Meagher G. and S. Wilson 2006.  ‘After Howard’s Decade, Is Australia more 
Conservative?’.  Australian Review of Public Affairs.  23 February.  
<http://www.australianreview.net/digest/2006/02/meagher_wilson.html>.  
Consulted 3 July 2006.  
Megalogenis G. 2003.  Faultlines: Race, Work and the Politics of Changing 
Australia.  Melbourne: Scribe. 
Megalogenis G. 2006.  The Longest Decade.  Melbourne: Scribe.  
Newman G. 2005.  Federal Election Results 1949–2004, Research Brief 11.  
Canberra: Parliamentary Library. 
Newman G. and A. Kopras 2004.  Socio-Economic Indexes for Electoral Divisions: 
2001 Census (2003 boundaries).  Current Issues Brief 1.  Canberra: Parliamentary 
Library. 
Scalmer S. 2005.  ‘Searching for the Aspirationals’.  Overland 180, Spring, 5-9.  
Scott A. 2004, ‘The Australian Labor Party and its Various Constituencies’, 
Refereed paper, Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, University 
of Adelaide, 29 September-1 October.  
<http://www.adelaide.edu.au/apsa/docs_papers/Aust%20Pol/Scott.pdf>.  
Consulted 5 July 2006. 
Turnbull, N. and S. Wilson, ‘The Two Faces of Economic Insecurity: Reply to Goot 
and Watson on One Nation’.  Australian Journal of Politics and History, 47: 512-
515. 
Watson, I., J. Buchanan, I. Campbell and C. Briggs.  2003.  Fragmented Futures: 
New Challenges in Working Life.  Sydney: The Federation Press. 
